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Introduction
Introduction
The debate about the relationship between social capital the welfare
state has produced contradictory results for a long time.
The crowding out hypothesis states that the growth of the welfare
state would erode social capital, as the action of the state leave no
room for non-regulated spontaneous cooperation.
The crowding in hypothesis states that there is virtuous circle
between the size of the welfare state and the stock of social capital in
a particular country, since generous welfare states (specially those
relying on universalistic programs) will produce a particular sense of
solidarity toward fellow citizens.
In this paper I focus on the relationship between social trust and
preferences for redistribution at the individual level in a sample of
European countries belonging to different welfare regimes.
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Theoretical approach
Trust and demand for redistribution
The crowding in hypothesis is based on a normative approach. It
argues that high levels of trust are important to maintain a well
developed welfare state, since it reduces the cost of service provision
and the cost of monitoring opportunistic behavior (Bjørnskov, 2011;
Bjørnskov and Svendsen, 2013).
Mature welfare states bolster the principle of reciprocity (the
perception of mutual obligations between fellow citizens) to ensure
the welfare of those who contribute to society (Rothstein, 1998;
2005). Universalistic programs are expected to promote trust, while
mean-tested programs are expected to do the opposite.
Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) find that Swedish citizens with more
contacts to needs-tested programs display lower levels of social trust.
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Theoretical approach
Trust and demand for redistribution
The rational choice approach to preferences for redistribution is based
on the idea that preferences depend on income (Meltzer and Richard,
1981).
However, expectations about the future (Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005; Benabou and Ok, 2001), and fairness concerns (Benabou and
Tirole, 2006; Piketty, 1995) have been incorporated into the rational
choice model.
Trust is a key element to understand the formation of preferences for
redistribution. According to Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011):
Trust limits the problem of free-riding.
Trust affects the trustworthiness of the government bureaucracy.
Trust reduces cheating on taxes and seeking transfers.
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Theoretical approach
Trust and demand for redistribution
Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer (2010) derive existence of
multiple equilibria in the relationship between trust and preferences
for government intervention: a bad equilibrium (low trust and intense
regulation) and a good equilibrium (high trust and low regulation)
When trust is low, individuals tend to rely on government intervention
to secure transactions. When trust is high, the government is less
needed to promote economic exchange.
Therefore, trust and preferences co-evolve. Societies get trapped in
one or another equilibrium and it is difficult to move from one to
another.
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Theoretical approach
Trust and demand for redistribution
Algan, Cahuc and Sangnier (2014) show the existence of a twin peaks
relation between trust and the size of the welfare state at the
aggregate level.
Uncivic people support large welfare states because they expect to
benefit from them without bearing their costs.
However, civic individuals support generous benefits and high taxes
only when they are surrounded by trustworthy individuals.
Drawing on this model and focusing at the individual level, I argue
that the lowest support for state intervention is expected at
intermediate levels of trust.
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Theoretical approach
Trust and demand for redistribution
Trust has two different (and opposite) implications for preferences for
state intervention:
Increasing trust implies the expectation that individuals will behave
nicely without state coercion. Therefore, state intervention will be less
needed.
However, it also implies less fear of others’ will cheat on claiming
benefits. Therefore, state intervention will be easily tolerated.
Those who do not trust their fellow citizens are highly supportive of
the welfare state because they want protection from externalities.
At the same time, trustful individuals are expected to support state
intervention because they are not concerned about cheating in
claiming benefits.
Moreover, we expect this pattern to be stronger in societies where
redistribution through state intervention is more intense.
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Data and methods
Variables
The dependent variable is support for redistribution (“government
should reduce differences in income levels”)
The key explanatory variable is general trust (“most people can be
trusted or you can’t be too careful”)
Controls:
Gender
Age group
Years of education
Working status
Income
Religiosity
Data: European Social Survey (2012)
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Data and methods
Selection of cases
Sweden belongs to the social-democratic welfare regime. High level of
decomodification, universal welfare programs and high levels of
redistribution through public policies.
Germany belongs to the conservative welfare regime. Moderate level
of decomodification. Social benefits mainly depend on labor status
and contributions. Moderate levels of income redistribution.
United Kingdom belongs to the liberal welfare regime. Low level of
decomodification. Welfare services provided by the market. Low levels
of income redistribution.
Spain belongs to the Mediterranean welfare regime. Fragmented
welfare services. Benefits connected to work status. Low levels of
income redistribution.
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Findings
Trust and demand for redistribution
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Findings
Trust and demand for redistribution
Sweden Germany UK Spain
Trust -0.085** -0.073** -0.054 0.009
(0.041) (0.029) (0.047) (0.035)
Trust2 0.008** 0.006** 0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Female 0.317*** 0.057 0.078 0.109**
(0.044) (0.039) (0.050) (0.045)
30-44 years 0.099 0.062 -0.076 0.041
(0.071) (0.065) (0.088) (0.072)
45-59 years 0.292*** 0.173*** -0.034 0.029
(0.071) (0.061) (0.089) (0.076)
60 and older 0.297*** 0.115* -0.103 -0.011
(0.071) (0.063) (0.095) (0.084)
Years of education -0.020*** -0.007 -0.017** -0.011**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004)
Unemployed 0.230** 0.213** 0.161 0.171***
(0.104) (0.094) (0.106) (0.065)
Not in the labor force 0.002 0.183*** -0.127* 0.008
(0.059) (0.048) (0.066) (0.063)
Income (ln) -0.081*** -0.136*** -0.190*** -0.061***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021)
Religiosity 0.001 -0.041*** 0.002 -0.031***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Constant 4.811*** 5.288*** 5.592*** 4.667***
(0.230) (0.177) (0.238) (0.192)
N 1605 2460 1712 1487
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Findings
Trust and demand for redistribution
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Conclusions
Conclusions
Main findings
Neither the crowding out hypothesis nor the crowding in hypothesis
are fully supported by the data.
The effect of trust on preferences for redistribution is not linear. The
demand for redistribution is low for intermediate levels of trust.
Open questions
The relationship between trust and preferences for redistribution vary
cross-nationally.
The problem of endogeneity and (posible) reverse causation.
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Thank you. Comments are welcome!!
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